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Household Mortgage Demand: A study of the UK, Australia and Japan 
 
Abstract 
 
Households combine their personal savings and mortgage debt to finance their home 
purchases. In developed countries, mortgage debt is the largest debt on a household’s 
balance sheet and in these countries, the mortgage penetration rates are high. For the 
stability of the mortgage market and thereby the money market in an economy, it is 
important to understand households’ mortgage demand decisions and riskiness of these 
borrowers. There are differences in mortgage systems among countries, which play an 
important role in determining the mortgage decisions that households make. These 
differences arise from the availability of types of mortgage instrument (adjustable 
versus fixed rate mortgages), length of fixed period for a fixed rate mortgage contracts, 
conditions of prepayment, tax treatment, lenders’ constraints related to repayment, 
loan to value ratio, foreclosure and personal bankruptcy laws etc. These differences 
impact borrowers’ choice of mortgage contract and mortgage demand. 
 
This paper analyses the mortgage demand behaviour of households in the UK, Australia 
and Japan. Specific questions that have been asked relate to the factors that determine 
household mortgage demand, housing demand and loan to value ratio. Though the 
homeownership is a preferred tenure and the mortgages are ‘recourse’ loans, housing 
markets in these three countries operate in different mortgage market institutional 
structure.  Results indicate that income elasticity of mortgage demand differ despite 
income elasticity of housing demand being similar. Mortgage institutions that pose 
constraints for borrowers also determine the extent of mortgage demand. Other factors 
such as demography, economic conditions have also played an important role in 
determining mortgage and housing demand. 
 
1. Introduction   
 
Benefits from homeownership cannot be understated in any society. Almost two-third 
of households in the UK, Australia and Japan live in ownership houses. The percentage 
homeownership rate has however declined recently from 70.6 percent in 2000 to 65.2 
percent in 2012 in the UK from 69.5 percent in 2001 to 68.7 percent in 2012 in 
Australia. In Japan the homeownership rate has marginally increased from 61.1 percent 
in 2007 to 61.9 percent in 2013 (Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/home-
ownership-rate). Mortgage has played a crucial role in enabling households to buy 
homes in 2012, nearly half of the homes were purchased using mortgage in the UK. 
However, this share of homes bought on mortgages has declined from 61.4 percent in 
2000. In Australia, home purchasers with mortgage are more than 50 percent in 2011 
and this has increased compared to 41 percent in 2001. These statistics indicate that 
though the homeownership rates in these countries are similar, the role that mortgages 
have played is somewhat varied. 
 
The objective of this paper is to understand the causes for differences in household 
mortgage demand in the UK, Australia and Japan. This is important for the stability of 
overall economy as well, as the mortgage market plays a very important role in the 
transmission of monetary policy, which has a profound impact on the macro economy. 
The mortgage market and monetary market are intertwined and due to the linkages 
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between the monetary market and the macro economy, changes in the mortgage market 
get transmitted to the macro economy. The proportion of fixed and variable rate 
mortgages is of great importance for the national economy as the interest rate shocks 
affect fixed and variable rate mortgages differently (Koblyakova, et al, 2014). The ARMs, 
which are linked to short term interest rate face far greater monetary policy risk than 
the FRMs. An economy, such as the UK, where the level of debt as a proportion of GDP is 
high and a large proportion of this debt is linked to adjustable rate mortgages, the risk 
of transmission of policy changes remain high. This, in times of crisis, poses challenges 
for effectiveness of monetary policy instruments to achieve financial stability.  
In recent times, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), is an example where the mortgage 
market caused the instability in the financial systems of various countries to various 
degrees. The financial and capital markets in the UK were strongly impacted due to the 
tight liquidity conditions that followed the GFC and this has affected the macro 
economy. Post GFC, the real GDP growth rate in the UK dropped to -4.3% in 2009 and 
the economy did not regain its pre-crisis level of growth until 2014.  The Australian 
financial and capital markets (monetary market) were not as badly influenced as the 
UK, and liquidity in the market was not so tight. One of the reasons could have been that 
Australia did not hold much of the asset-backed securities (mortgage backed securities 
and its derivatives) linked to the sub-prime crisis, which contained the impact of GFC in 
the country. The real GDP growth, though slowed, never became negative during the 
GFC.  Similar to Australia, Japan also did not witness tight liquidity conditions post GFC. 
The real GDP growth rate in Japan has been low witnessing negative values frequently 
after the bubble burst in late 1990s during the so-called “lost decade(s)”. The real GDP 
growth in Japan during the GFC was also negative with growth rates of -3.7% and -2.0% 
in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The strength of the linkage between the mortgage 
market and macro economy differs among countries depending on the characteristic of 
the mortgage market, its institutions and structure of mortgage debt. This paper 
investigates the demand side of the mortgage market. 
 
Specifically, the paper aims to understand the drivers of mortgage market and their 
impact. To accomplish this objective, it is critical to analyse household behaviour over 
mortgage choice and its demand. In particular, what determines household mortgage 
demand? Furthermore what is the relation between mortgage demand and a particular 
mortgage instrument? Literature suggests that the mortgage demand by a household is 
derived from their housing demand or said alternatively, housing and mortgage demand 
are jointly determined (Leece, 2006; Koblyakova et al., 2014). Therefore, this paper 
analyses mortgage choice as simultaneously determined with mortgage demand and 
also with housing demand. 
 
The three countries, the UK, Australia and Japan, included in this paper provide a 
context of very similar policy objective and consumer preferences with regards to 
homeownership but they offer diversity in mortgage market institutions and available 
instruments despite the fact that mortgages are recourse type of loans in these three 
countries. The institutions differ in terms of availability of mortgage contract types, 
implementation of foreclosure and personal bankruptcy laws. As has been observed 
earlier that the homeownership rates in three countries are similar, however, to achieve 
these very similar homeownership rates, the extent of mortgage debt that households 
have accessed and the type of mortgage instrument that they have chosen is different 
across these countries. Households in the UK and Australia have predominantly chosen 
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adjustable rate mortgages, ARM (also called variable rate mortgages, VRM), while in 
Japan the choice has been quite varied from VRMs to short-term and to long-term 
housing loan instruments. The difference in the extent of mortgage penetration in these 
countries is reflected in the level of outstanding mortgage debt as a proportion of GDP. 
In the UK, the ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to GDP is 70%, in Australia it is 80% 
and in Japan it is less than 30%. Besides the type of mortgage instrument (ARM or fixed 
rate mortgages, FRM), length of fixed period of FRM, conditions imposed by lenders 
regarding prepayment, tax treatment, lenders’ constraints (mortgage payment to 
income ratio, downpayment to house value ratio), foreclosure and bankruptcy laws and 
practices also differ among these three countries. 
 
Despite the differences in practices employed in mortgage markets in the UK, Australia 
and Japan, a large proportion of households have fulfilled their homeownership dreams 
by accessing mortgage finance. Their decisions have involved the level of debt and the 
type of mortgage instrument (FRM or ARM).  
 
With this background, this paper analyses the determinants of mortgage demand and 
housing demand of households in the UK, Australia and Japan. This is achieved by 
basing the analysis within the theoretical framework of mortgage demand (see Leece, 
2004; Chapter 2). These models are highly suggestive of empirical specifications for 
econometric estimation of mortgage demand. The empirical estimation takes the form 
of econometric estimates of mortgage demand, housing demand and initial loan to value 
ratio as separate equations. Cross sectional estimations utilize data extracted from 
Understanding Society Survey (USS) for the UK, from The Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) for Australia and from Keio Household Panel 
Survey (KHPS) for Japan.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the relevant literature while 
Section 3 details econometric methodology applied in the paper. Section 4 discusses the 
data. The penultimate section presents the findings and interpretation of the results and 
the final section forms the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Several factors influence the demand for mortgage debt within the mortgage market. 
Besides demand for housing (Follain, 1990; Jones, 1993), these incorporate efficiency of 
the mortgage system, lending conditions, availability of mortgage types, regulatory 
constraints and economic environment (Lea, 2011; Miles, 2012). In a perfectly efficient 
mortgage market, under the Modigliani and Miller’s theoretical propositions, borrowers 
should be indifferent to the size, mortgage type and gearing features of the mortgage 
contract (Leece, 2004). However, the institutional features of a mortgage market imply 
varying degree of mortgage constraints, which affect mortgage debt and mortgage 
instrument choices (Diamond and Lea, 1992; Campbell and Cocco, 2003).   
 
Factors that affect house price movements and changes in mortgage flows include 
changes in household demographic situations, personal disposable income and changes 
in interest and tax rates. Among empirical studies, Follain and Dunsky (1997) and Ling 
and McGill (1998) employed US household-level data in econometric estimates of 
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mortgage demand. The results for household mortgage demand highlight the 
importance of demographic and economic factors such as age and personal income and 
highlight that tax savings, associated with interest deductions, significantly affect the 
size of mortgage debt. Leece (2004, 2006), using the UK data, suggests that borrowers’ 
choices about mortgage debt and type of mortgage contract depend on opportunities to 
acquire the housing debt. Employing nominal interest rates and regional house price 
inflation as proxies for the user cost of owner occupation, their research recognizes the 
importance of differentials in regional house prices in the decisions on mortgage size. At 
the macroeconomic level, the stability of the mortgage finance system in a country also 
depends on the level of household indebtedness and the distribution of variable, or 
fixed rate contracts (Duca, et. al., 2010). The structural variations in housing finance 
systems impose various degrees of sensitivity to changes in policy rates, depending on 
household’s leverage, size and type of mortgage debt (McLennan, et. al., 2000; Campbell, 
2012). Papers that have also explored the within country regional variations in the 
mortgage markets, have suggested that the level of mortgage debt is the key factor for 
the differentials in the impact of monetary policy within the UK (Evans and McCormick, 
1994; Leece 2004) and the US (Campbell, 2012). Results also suggest that liquidity 
constraints and higher mortgage interest burdens have effectively restricted the 
demand for mortgage debt.  
 
Extending the discussion on mortgage demand to cross-country comparisons, the cross-
country variations in economic conditions, housing and mortgage market institutions 
adds another nuance to the discussion. Given that the tax regime and monetary policy 
structure differs in different countries impacting their house prices differently, it is 
expected that cross-country variations in house prices substantially influence the 
starting point of households in entering owner-occupation (Lea, 2010). House price 
variations also lead to variable expectations about capital gains, facilitating an 
increase/decrease in housing and mortgage demands depending on the direction of 
expectations and accordingly reinforcing house price positively/negatively (Taltavull de 
La Paz and White 2012). Thus, the differing economic conditions in various countries 
may result in different effect of monetary policy on mortgage market operation; 
however, academic research in this area has been hampered by paucity of cross country 
data availability (Bell and Lowe, 2000).  
 
Among the few studies that explore mortgage choice decisions from the cross-national 
perspective, Badarinza, et. al., (2017) suggest that the mortgage markets are highly 
heterogeneous across countries, demonstrating varying effects over the space and time. 
Exploring whether households choose a mortgage contract responding to current 
interest rate regime or based on expected future changes in mortgage prices, Badarinza 
et al (2017) show that the structure of mortgage rates are strong predictors of mortgage 
choice decisions. Their findings suggest that in a tight lending markets, liquidity 
constrained households will choose the cheapest available options, with the aim to 
balance their current level of consumption and maximum level of the mortgage debt. 
  
In their cross-country study, Dow and Montagoni (2007) consider the possibility of 
impact of differences in the cost for mortgage loans and availability of mortgage debt 
arising due to differences in mortgage policies on mortgage demand.  Their research 
identifies differences in cross country variations in the housing finance costs.  They also 
found that national financial institutions respond differently to changes in monetary 
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policy reflecting cross-country variations in credit conditions. Thus, depending on the 
state of local industry and on the asset values of collateral, credit attributes may differ in 
different countries and regions. Further, considering the differences in the lending and 
borrowing channels, Dow and Montagoni (2007) provide empirical evidence of the 
cross-country differences of the various groupings of financial markets and 
intermediaries. Notably, cross country differences in the cost of credit is explained by 
the disproportional creation of critical mass of financial activity and intensity of 
mortgage intermediaries in certain countries. 
 
Further, cross country difference in demographic trends and its influence on the 
housing market has been explored by Levin et al, (2009). Highlighting the importance of 
demographic factors on size of mortgage debt, findings suggest that differences in the 
rate of growth of age groups relevant to first time buyers are particularly important. 
They suggest that a decline in real house prices and mortgage borrowing levels are 
more likely to occur in the countries where younger population is expected to decline in 
size.  
 
Cross country disparities in the distribution of income may also cause various 
responses from housing and mortgage markets across the countries. Besley et al, (2010) 
suggest that countries characterized by higher incomes and higher house prices provide 
better lending conditions for mortgage contracts. 
 
Investigating cross country variations in mortgage debt decisions, Campbell (2012) 
examines the potential impact of national economic features on the mortgage market 
structure, which influences households’ behavior towards debt. Household’s demand 
for debt is governed by the choice of house location, the decision to become a 
homeowner and the choice of mortgage rate. The choice of mortgage rate relates to the 
risk of changes occurring in the macroeconomic environment that affects a household’s 
circumstances. Results suggest that a mortgagee, who is constrained, faces significant 
risk from uncertainty and timing, as is implied by the variable mortgage rate option that 
she chooses. Given a cross countries’ perspective, this may suggest that countries with 
the prevalent variable mortgage debt have inherently higher interest rate risks and are 
less financially stable. 
 
Analyzing the role of differences in economic conditions at the regional level, Cho et al. 
(2012) suggest that mortgage risks differ due to differing underlying risks across 
regions which impart heterogeneity in mortgage loans. Analyzing the period 1993-2007 
they indicate that a long term equilibrium relationships exist betw en the mortgage 
default rates and regionally differentiated economic and social variables associated with 
mortgage affordability and liquidity constraints such as incomes and unemployment 
rates, which impact a household’s ability to afford mortgage repayments. It may be 
hypothesized that a similar outcome could be expected in at cross-country level because 
the economic and mortgage market condition would differ. 
 
There is paucity of academic literature in understanding the impact of mortgage market 
institutions on mortgage debt. Mortgages in the UK, Australia and Japan are recourse 
loans implying that a lender may seek financial damages beyond the mortgages housing 
asset if the borrower fails to pay the liability, and if the value of the underlying asset is 
not enough to cover it. Theory would suggest that recourse should deter default on 
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home loans and have implications for mortgage demand. However, the extent to which 
these recourses can be manifested differ across different countries and hence the effect 
on mortgage demand could differ. In the US, recourse/non-resource nature of housing 
loan is a state law generating different outcomes across states. In Australia, personal 
bankruptcies are low due to severe consequences of bankruptcy under Australian Law 
and difficulty that one faces in accessing finance after bankruptcy (Kitson et al., 2015). 
There is no specific protection afforded to bankrupts and if the “bankrupt is sole owner, 
and no other person has an interest (legal or equitable) in the property, neither the 
bankrupt nor the bankrupt’s family has any right to remain in the possession of the 
home” (Mason and O’Mahony, 2014).  If loan falls in arrears, the realization of the 
security property through sale can take between 8-12 months on average (Kitson et al. 
2015). The process of foreclosure is also simple and requires an order from Registrar – 
General on satisfying the conditions of default. In Japan, almost all mortgages are 
recourse with very tiny fraction being non-recourse (Asset Enhancement Securities 
Limited, 2005). The “Civil Execution Act: Minji Shikkoo Hoo: Code No. 4 – 1980, Article 
22” defines the court orders and processes required for foreclosure. However, the 
Japanese court procedure in mortgage foreclosure is slow and could take as much as 24 
months (ibid). In the case of the UK, as discussed by Aron and Muellbauer (2016), the 
default rates during the Global Financial Crisis were low due to government’s generous 
support for borrowers with payment problems and increased forbearance (by lowering 
the rate of repossessions and increasing the rate of arrears) by banks, lending to the 
view that foreclosure is not as ruthless as the definition of “recourse” would imply. 
Their estimates further highlighted that forbearance changed with economic conditions.  
Summarizing the findings, previous research has used utility maximization theory from 
a life cycle perspective as a theoretical basis for analyzing mortgage demand, while 
recognizing mortgage market constraints related to liquidity and affordability. Previous 
studies inform the econometric specification and suggest several explanatory variables 
for inclusion in empirical model of mortgage demand. In an international context, it 
appears that the cross-country differences in interest rate regime, lending conditions, 
liquidity constraints, pricing of risks, demographic trends and macroeconomic 
fundamentals play a deterministic role in mortgage debt and mortgage choice decisions. 
However, the role of mortgage institutions in a cross-country analysis has been less 
investigated, which becomes a gap for further investigation. While present paper 
highlights the role of mortgage institutions, it leaves detailed investigation into the 
regulations and practices that impact mortgage demand for future research. 
 
3. The three-country context and the data 
 
Table 1 presents the key demographic, economic, housing and mortgage market 
characteristics in Australia, Japan and the UK. While the homeownership rates and 
household preference towards homeownership are similar in these countries, the socio-
economic and housing market environment is different. This makes these three 
countries interesting cases for understanding the drivers of mortgage demand. 
 
Demographically too, the size of population is quite diﬀerent between Australia, the UK 
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and Japan. Population of Japan is the largest, while other two countries have almost 
half the population of Japan. Although the population of Japan is large, it is declining in 
absolute numbers, while the population in other two countries is growing owing to 
international immigration. These countries are facing an increase in the number of 
one-person household partly due to the delay in age of marriage (and due to non-
marriage) and partly due to population ageing. Rising life expectancy is further 
increasing the number of aged population. The life expectancy of Japan is the highest in 
the world and the rate  of  ageing  is also the highest.  Regarding fertility rate, there is a 
notable diﬀerence between three countries. Japan has been suﬀering from a low 
fertility f r a long time, however Australia and the UK are not. The household size has 
become smaller in all three countries therefore the number of households is increasing 
in the UK and Australia but is decreasing in Japan because the total population decline. 
 
Demographic diﬀerences impact housing market signiﬁcantly. The number of houses 
exceeds that of households in Japan, then vacancy rate has been rising amounting to 
more than 13.5 percent (Moriizumi, 2015). On the other hand, there is a shortage of 
housing in the UK and Australia due to a strong pressure of demand for housing caused 
by increasing population. The vacancy rate in the UK has decreased from17 percent in 
2009 to 12 percent in 2014, while in Australia, it is about 10.7 percent in 2011(ibid). It 
is interesting that even though Australia faces population increasing, its vacancy rate 
keeps constantly low. Owing to shortage of housing in Australia and the UK, there is 
excess demand in these countries causing high volatility in house prices in these 
countries. On the other hand, housing prices, have been declining for a long time in 
Japan and volatility in house prices is not so large in Japan due to excess supply. 
 
The homeownership rates in these three countries have been declining despite low 
mortgage rates, favourable tax treatment and several ﬁnancial assistance by 
government, especially for first time buyers (Moriizumi, 2015). The homeownership 
rate among young households has been continuously declining, whereas the 
ownership rate for the elderly has been above the average rate of homeownership in 
these three countries. Moriizumi (2015), in case of Japan proposes that the reasons for 
declining homeownership among young households are factors such as late marriage 
or non- marriage, and economic and ﬁnancial downturn. While declining fertility rate 
may increase expectations about bequest, delay in receiving bequest due to rising life 
expectancy is also causing delays in homeownership of young households (ibid). The 
fertility rate in Australia and the UK is not declining but the homeownership rate 
among young households in these countries is low. Late marriage or non-marriage 
leading to late formation of household is a common influence causing delays in 
homeownership across all countries. 
 
Housing markets and mortgage markets operate within the broader economy. The 
impact of GFC on economy, financial markets and hence housing has been diﬀerent 
among countries. The ﬁnancial and capital markets in the UK were strongly impacted 
resulting in tightening of liquidity and slowdown in the economy.  The real GDP 
growth rate of the UK dropped to −4.3% in 2009. Australian ﬁnancial and capital 
markets (monetary market) were not so badly affected as the UK, and liquidity was not 
so tight. One of the reasons probably was that Australia did not hold asset 
backed securities that were linked to sub-prime loans. The real GDP growth 
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rate, though declined, never became negative during GFC. Similar to Australia, Japan 
was not strongly impacted by GFC with respect to liquidity tightness. The real GDP 
growth rate in Japan has been low having negative values often after the bubble burst 
in late 1991s, during the so called “lost decade(s)”. The real GDP growth rate during 
GFC was also negative with -3.7% and -2.0% in 2008 and 2009, respectively. After 
GFC it recovered to the level of almost 2%. 
  
The unemployment rate rose with the GFC in all three countries but has dropped 
in the UK and Japan. The unemployment rate in Australia has not yet fallen to the 
pre-GFC levels and the labor market is yet to recover. The inﬂation rate is decreasing in 
all three countries and Japan has been suﬀering from deﬂation for a long period since 
2000s. These diﬀerences in the macro economy are reﬂected in household economic 
conditions, which signiﬁcantly inﬂuence household behavior towards borrowing and 
buying a house, especially the behaviour of young household and first time buyers.  
 
Economic and ﬁnancial factors, such as unemployment rate, house price, mortgage rates 
are closely related to each other. Rising house prices and house price volatility as in 
the UK and Australia certainly depresses the ownership rate, while low mortgage 
rates promote home purchases. Tight credit constraints, especially during and after 
the GFC has likely depressed home buying activity among young home buyers. As for 
Japan although house (land and real estate) prices and mortgage rates have been 
declining at the same time, homeownership rates has also fallen for decades. From the 
economic standpoint, income volatility and unemployment rate are related, which have 
been high in Japan due to the sluggish economic conditions that have prevailed since 
late 1991s. Besides the negative and positive impacts of demographics mentioned 
above, these economic and ﬁnancial factors have signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the behavior of 
young home buyers in  Japan. 
 
The three countries included in this paper present quite diﬀerent systems of mortgage 
structure. Australia and the UK are dominated by variable rate mortgages (VRM) with 
short-term initial ﬁxed rate, while there is a wide range of interest rate structures in 
Japan, from VRM to FRM with short-term, medium-term (3-15years) and long-term 
(20-35 years) fixed rate mortgages. Convertible loan is also prevalent in Japan. Initial 
ﬁxed-rate discounts are common in all three countries. 
In a perfect market, as per Modigliani Miller hypothesis, these structures should not 
affect households’ mortgage decisions. However, with asymmetric information and 
other inefficiencies, these diﬀerences may inﬂuence the behavior of mortgage 
borrower’s mortgage choice. 
 
As discussed in Moriizumi (2015), the spread between FRM and ARM has always been 
positive, as expected in the finance theory. In the UK during GFC, and in Australia in 
most years since 1990s, ARM and FRM rates were very close and the relationship had 
reversed very often even before the GFC. In Japan, Government Housing Loan 
Corporation (GHLC), before its abolition, directly provided a long-term mortgage to 
borrowers at low interest rates by policy. The rate on ARM did not often change and it 
was ﬁxed to be higher than FRM (GHLC mortgage). Consequently, the share of FRM 
has been larger than that of ARM for a long time. However, after the abolition of GHLC 
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the mortgage rate for ARM is lower than FRM and the spread between FRM and 
ARM has been within a very narrow range. Recently the share of ARM has been 
rising (Moriizumi, 2015). 
 
Features of mortgage instruments across countries impact prospect borrowers in 
each country. The size of mortgage market and t h e  share of ARM to FRM 
depends on which mortgage instrument borrowers select and to what extent they 
demand for. The share of ARM in the mortgage market is the largest in Australia. 
ARM’s share is increasing in Japan amounting to more than 40%. 
  
Moriizumi (2015) notes that housing loan to income ratio during 2006-2010 is the 
highest in the UK, followed by Australia, and i s  the lowest in Japan.  T h e  r a t i o  
h a s  d e c r e a s e d  in the UK and Japan after GFC, while in Australia it has stayed at 
high level. It is interesting issue therefore, whether or not households take out a loan  
to buy homes and to what proportion of house value do they finance using mortgage.    
 
The paper uses three datasets. For Australia, The Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel survey data for years 2002 (wave 2), 2006 (wave 
6) and 2010 (wave 10) have been employed. In HILDA dataset, these are the years 
where question on original mortgage amount was asked. For Japan, the Keio Housing 
Panel Survey (KHPS) data for years between 2004-2011 (all available waves) have been 
used. In case of KHPS, all existing waves of survey have asked the question regarding 
initial mortgage amount. Hence all the waves have been included in the research. For 
the UK, the paper uses the Understanding Society Survey (USS) for years 2009 and 
2012. They are also years where original mortgage amount is available from the survey 
question.  
 
The difference in the periods across three datasets does not pose problem as dummy for 
time in the estimation control for differences in period. This paper has taken advantage 
of the full data range that is available.  
   
The descriptive statistics is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 indicates that in the Australian data, 7.4 percent of households have taken a 
fixed rate mortgage. The proportion of fixed rate mortgages in Japan is about 41.3 
percent and for the UK is 39.4 percent, substantially higher than Australia. This clearly 
indicates the differences in preference and/or availability of different mortgage 
instruments. The average age of borrowers in Australian data is 42.3 years while in 
Japan the average age is 47.4 years and the UK is 39.4 years. This possibly indicates that 
households in the UK or Australia may be better positioned in terms of affordability and 
face less liquidity constraints than Japanese households. The mortgage payment to 
income ratio in Australia and Japan are very similar at around 23 and 22 percent 
respectively. In the UK, the mortgage payment to income ratio is about 17 percent.  
 
4. Econometric Methodology 
 
The modeling approach involves estimation of three equations using ordinary least 
squares: mortgage demand function, housing demand function and initial loan to value 
ratio function. Equations 1 to 3 represent formal structure of these equations. Equation 
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1 models Mortgage demand as a function of independent variables - household income, 
household characteristics such as the age of borrower, household size, income and 
mortgage payment structure. Dummies for rural and urban locations, regions have also 
been included. In order to capture the differences in mortgage origination, dummies for 
mortgage originations have been included. The second equation models housing 
demand as a function of independent variables that relate to household characteristics 
and income. In order to capture the mortgage market characteristics, variables for 
mortgage instrument choice and payment to income ratio have also been included.  The 
three equations to be estimated are as follows: 
 
1) Mortgage demand function: 
 
 = 
 + 
 + 
 +  
 
2) Housing demand function: 
 
 =  +  +  +  
 
3) Initial loan to value ratio function: 
 
/ =  +  +  +  
 
 
The description of variables is as follows: 
 
Mortgage value at origination (: This is the amount of initial loan that households 
took out at the time of purchase of their house. Since mortgage amount is measured in 
local currency unit (i.e., AUD for Australia, Yen for Japan, and GBP for the UK), we take 
the natural logarithm of this variable. This allows us to interpret estimated coefficients 
as (semi-) elasticity (which does not depend on the unit of measurement). 
 
Purchase price of house : This is the price paid for house at the time of purchase. 
 
Initial loan to value ratio /: This reflects the loan as a percentage of value of 
house. 
 
Mortgage instrument choice (: 1 if fixed interest rate mortgage, 0 otherwise. Fixed 
rate mortgages are defined as mortgages that remained fixed for at least three 
consecutive years since origination. In case of Japan, KHPS asks a direct question 
whether the mortgage is fixed rate. We simply use the answer to this question, which 
includes, in principle, any fixed rate mortgage. For Australia and the UK, HILDA and 
BHPS do not have survey questions that directly ask mortgage contract type. We 
therefore impute the type of contract by looking at respondent's repayment history. If 
the repayment for a mortgage is constant across three consecutive years, we assume 
that the mortgage is fixed rate contract. This approach of identifying fixed rate mortgage 
in the case of the UK is same as Koblyakova et al (2014). 
 
Age Age is the age of household head in the sample at period ‘t’. 
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Household Size: Represents the size of household in period ‘t’. 
 
Number of children: Represents number of children in the household in period ‘t’. 
 
Gross household income : Annual gross income of household in local currency in 
period ‘t’.  
 
Payment to income ratio : This variable represents mortgage payment to income ratio in 
period ‘t’. 
 
Urban-rural dummies: 1 if the property is located in urban areas; 0 otherwise. 
 
Regional dummies: These are dummies for different regions in a country. 
 
Dummies for mortgage origination years: These are dummies for years of origination of 
mortgage. 
 
The purpose of equation (3) above is to explore an important relation between 
mortgage demand and housing demand. By definition, income elasticity for initial LTV is 
the difference between income elasticity for purchase price of home and mortgage 
amount. Taking the difference between equations (1) and (2) yields: 
 
 −  = 	/ = 	 +  +  + , 
 
which implies that  ≡ 
 −  ; " ≡ 
" − "; # ≡ 
# − #. 
 
Estimation of equation 3 allows us to capture the difference in coefficients of 
independent variables in mortgage demand and purchase price of house equations. This 
is particularly important for the variable, “gross household income”. The coefficient of 
gross household income in mortgage demand function is the income elasticity of 
mortgage and the coefficient of gross household income in housing demand function is 
the income elasticity of purchase price of house.  The difference between the two 
elasticity estimates (as measured by the coefficient of income in initial loan to value 
function) allows us to understand the role of the mortgage market institution in 
determining deviation in demand for mortgages in response to changes in income from 
demand for housing in response to changes in income. We utilize this feature to 
understand how these deviations move over time. 
 
The paper estimates the three functions described above for the UK, Australia and 
Japan. In order to ascertain the equality of coefficients of various variables across these 
countries, a test for coefficient equality has been conducted (Chow, 1960).  
 
5. Results 
 
The estimates of the three functions are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The choice of 
fixed rate mortgages negatively influenced the demand for mortgage in all three 
countries. The fixed rate mortgages lead to smaller size debt for liquidity-constrained 
households. The price effect and large positive premium associated with fixed rate 
mortgages lead to lower mortgage debt. The coefficient is much higher for Australia 
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than for the UK and Japan. This may be due to the prevalence for variable rate 
mortgages to a greater extent in Australia and a likely selling of these mortgage 
contracts to households by financial advisers. The spread that lenders have charged for 
FRM over ARM is low in Australia compared to the UK. The low interest environment 
has continued in Australia even after GFC.  
 
Looking at the life cycle factors, the coefficient of Age has a positive sign for the UK 
while negative for Australia and Japan. In the UK, households tend to acquire larger 
properties in later stage of life (Koblyakova et al., 2014) and that explain the positive 
sign. This is confirmed by the housing demand function (presented in Table 3). The 
effect of age on size of property, however, is at decreasing marginal rate as indicated by 
small size coefficient of squared term of age variable. In case of Australia, however, 
while households buy larger properties as they age (as seen from positive sign of 
coefficient for Age in housing demand function, Table 3), the tendency to take out larger 
mortgage debt with age declines. It’s likely that the risk of taking out larger loans due to 
the recourse nature of debt in Australia deters households from increasing their debt. 
While the mortgages are recourse loans in the UK and Japan as well, Australian 
foreclosure and bankruptcy laws operate quite expediently in case of a mortgage default 
compared to other two countries. Households increase their proportion of equity 
contribution as they buy larger houses. In Japan, the size of debt declined with age and 
so did housing demand. The sign of the coefficient of household size in mortgage 
demand function is negative for Australia and Japan while positive for the UK. In case of 
Australia, it could be possible that larger household size is crowding out demand for 
mortgage debt (Table 2) and housing (Table 3), but reliability on this explanation is 
weak as the coefficients are insignificant. The reliability on the sign of coefficients of 
household size in the UK and Japan is also weak due to insignificance of the estimates. 
 
With higher number of children, households in the UK, Australia and Japan desire bigger 
homes and they take out bigger debts in order to fulfill their requirements. The positive 
coefficient of mortgage payment to income ratio reflects the borrowing constraints and 
lending market conditions. What is interesting is the relatively high payment to income 
ratio elasticity for mortgage demand in the UK than in Australia or Japan. This reflects 
that relatively the UK mortgage market is less constrained than Australia and Japan. The 
payment to income elasticity for housing demand (Table 3) is very similar across three 
countries. This is important as it indicates that households do not increase their housing 
demand due to increase in payment to income ratio but rather increase their 
component of debt to finance the purchase in the UK. Given that the policies of 
government and lenders’ attitude towards households who face income stress is 
accommodative and supportive in the UK (Aron and Muellbauer, 2017), despite 
mortgages being recourse, explains household behaviour. In Japan and Australia, the 
recourse nature of mortgages poses restrictive conditions for households.   
 
The most important result of the analysis is the difference in income elasticity for 
mortgage demand among three countries with the UK being the highest (Table 2). The 
income elasticity of housing demand (Table 3) is also higher for the UK than Australia 
and Japan but the difference is not as big as in the case of income elasticity of mortgage 
demand. One possible argument for small income elasticity of mortgage demand for 
Japan could be due to the narrower range of housing options or greater willingness of 
households to pay for other consumption/investment items. In order to see if these 
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alternative explanations are indeed true, we look at the estimation results for (log of) 
purchase price of housing and the initial loan-to-value ratio functions. If mortgage 
demand in Japan is income inelastic due to smaller housing options or greater demand 
for other consumption/investment items, then income elasticity for purchase price of 
housing would also be small as well. The results (Table 3) shows that income elasticity 
for purchase price of housing in Japan are similar (though statistically different in some 
cases) to the UK and Australia. This suggests that relatively small income elasticity for 
mortgage demand in Japan is a result of different lending practice (i.e., mortgage lenders 
in Japan tend to respond less to the rise in household income levels) and lenders’ 
forbearance during defaults. The results are similar for Australia and Japan. 
  
Regression results for initial LTVs are shown in Table 4. While estimated income 
elasticity of LTV is comparable between Australia and UK, it is strikingly different for 
Japan. The negative coefficient for Japan can be a result of different income responses to 
housing demand and mortgage lending. If richer households tend to purchase more 
expensive homes, whereas mortgage amount does not rise sufficiently, income elasticity 
for initial LTV can be negative (i.e., richer households tend to have lower LTVs). To 
examine this further, we separate the sample based on the purchase year of housing 
(prior to 1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005 and after 2006), and estimate the 
same regression models for LTVs. The results are shown in Table 5, which shows that 
the negative coefficient of household income is observed only for mortgages originated 
between 1991 and 2000, which may be due to reluctance on the part of mortgage 
lenders to extend new loans. Again this is the reflection of the mortgage market 
conditions, which are far easier in the UK. Aron and Muellbauer (2016) argued that in 
the UK, generous government policies lowered the foreclosure by 21 per cent and 
lenders’ forbearance reduced foreclosure by an additional 13 per cent. In the UK, 
lenders can access other assets and other incomes of borrowers for up to seven years to 
settle the debt. In practice, the foreclosure happens after all other supportive policies of 
government and lenders fail to cure the situation, which is not frequent occurrence. In 
Japan in case of default the underlying lien (mortgage) is transferred from a bank to a 
credit guarantee company who then subrogates the debt, usually by auction. If after the 
auction, the company cannot recover the debt, it accesses other assets of the borrower, 
as the loan is recourse loan. Sometimes short sale of underlying property is also a way 
that is used to recover unpaid debt. When the default is caused by a borrower's death, 
the outstanding debt is completely covered by private insurance company. A borrower 
is required by the bank to take out the life insurance. On the other hand if default is 
caused by illness of a borrower and the borrower does not have insurance that covers 
illness, the property is foreclosed. For a brief period of December 4, 2009 until March 
31, 2013 "Moratorium law" was enacted which allowed borrowers to ask lenders to 
change (relax) the terms of contract; amount of payment or amortization term when 
borrowers were facing payment stress and lenders were required to approve such 
requests as far as possible. However, this law has expired now. During extreme natural 
and economic events such as "bubble" burst in Japan, the government implicitly 
supported non-bank financial institutions to prevent bankruptcies due to rising defaults 
and allowed borrowers to negotiate their payments to reduce the burden. Generally 
speaking the recourse loan is restrictive for a borrower in Japan except in cases of 
extreme events. Australia mortgage market is restrictive in events of default. The loans 
are foreclosed and disposed off in the event of default in fairly short period without 
much opportunity for borrower to renegotiate. Being recourse loan, lenders also have 
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claim to other assets of borrowers to cover their loans. 
 
The discussion above indicates that the mortgage market regulatory framework and 
institutional culture plays an important role in determining mortgage demand. This is 
an important area for future research. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the mortgage demand and housing demand in the UK, Australia and 
Japan. There are large differences in mortgage systems among these three countries, for 
instance, type of mortgage instrument (ARM vs FRM), length of fixed period of FRM, 
conditions of prepayment, tax treatment, lenders’ constraints (mortgage payment to 
income ratio, downpayment to house value ratio) etc., which impact borrowers’ choice 
of mortgage and its demand. The comparative analysis, however, brings out interesting 
results related to mortgage and housing demand, the most important being the 
mortgage institutional structure particularly related to foreclosure. For the markets 
where the mortgages are recourse loans, borrowers may borrow less compared to 
markets that have non-recourse loans because in the case of default, recourse loans 
allow lenders to foreclose any asset in addition to the mortgaged property to recover 
outstanding loans. This is particularly true during declining house price conditions. 
While the mortgage in the UK is a recourse loan like Australia and Japan, lenders 
foreclose properties only in extreme situations where government support or lenders 
renegotiations don’t alleviate borrowers payment stress. This is not the case in Japan 
and Australia. This has resulted in higher income elasticity of mortgage demand in the 
UK than the other two markets. 
 
An interesting finding from the study is that though there are large differences in the 
mortgage system (market) among three countries, borrowers when they choose a FRM 
their mortgage amounts are less than otherwise. Further to the conclusions of Naoi, 
Moriizumi and Yukutake (2013) and Kobliyakova et al (2014) where they show that a 
risky borrower chooses ARM as mortgage instrument, this paper shows that, in 
addition, a FRM borrower borrows less than an ARM borrower. This reinforces further 
that FRM borrowers are less risky than ARM borrowers. The FRM borrower is not a 
short-sighted decision maker and makes its plan including repayment of loan on a long 
term basis despite of length of the fixed term that is available in the market. Therefore 
the choice of mortgage instrument is a good screening device for distinguishing 
between a safe borrower and a risky borrower. 
 
Housing market conditions have also played an important role in determining mortgage 
demand. During the period of analysis in this paper, while Australia experienced secular 
rise in house prices, Japan suffered from constant decline. The UK also witnessed 
upward trend in house prices from 1990 onwards except after the GFC when the prices 
fell. If we look at the function with initial LTV as a dependent variable, the income 
coefficient for Japan turned out to be negative for mortgages originated between 1991 
and 1995, the period in which Japan’s house price dropped significantly after the bubble 
burst, the so called “lost decade(s)”. 
 
As is often said that the Japanese are in general risk-averse, households don’t like to 
borrow much, even though they are in the highest income class. High income 
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households save more for the down payment, which implies that the mortgage 
penetration at the economy level is very low. In fact from the micro data it is evident 
that a household does not borrow much, which implies low income elasticity of 
mortgage demand. In other words, attitudes toward risk are different among the three 
countries and this is reflected in the income elasticity of mortgage demand. Risk also 
arises from the way foreclosure laws are implemented. In Japan and Australia, the laws 
are implemented expediently in comparison to the UK. This leads to lower elasticity of 
mortgage demand in Australia and Japan than the UK. The income elasticity for the UK is 
the largest among the three countries. This implies that the impact of change in 
mortgage market such as the rise and fall of mortgage rate, increase in number of 
default, arrears or delinquency etc., on monetary market in the UK is the strongest in 
the three countries. This is consistent with the fact that during the GFC the UK was 
affected most significantly among the three countries. 
  
Demographic factors also explain the differences in mortgage demand between three 
countries. The population is growing in the UK and in Australia, while it is declining in 
Japan. Japan has been suffering from fertility decline for a long period. Even though 
fertility is declining in Australia and the UK, population is increasing owing to migration. 
These demographic factors impact income elasticity of housing demand because 
households demand less house space due to the decline in the number of children. 
Declining fertility can prompt inter-vivos transfer or increase its amount, while it 
reduces the mortgage demand. 
 
Increasing population in Australia and the UK has a strong pressure for housing 
demand, causing mortgage demand to rise. On the contrary there is an excess supply in 
housing market in Japan, which may imply that the mortgage market in Japan may not 
be as active as in Australia and the UK. Further investigation indicates that as age of 
household advances a household borrows more until certain age in Australia and the 
UK, however, the impact of age on mortgage borrowing is opposite in Japan. Households 
borrow more during young age in Australia and the UK. In Japan, however, due to excess 
supply in the housing market, low fertility and high ageing rates, borrowers borrow 
less. This suggests that the linkage between mortgage and monetary markets will be 
weak in the future in Japan, while those of Australia and the UK will be stronger for a 
long time 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Australia 
 
Japan 
 
UK 
 
  Mean (S.D.)   Mean (S.D.)   Mean (S.D.)   
Fixed = 1 0.0741  (0.2620) 
 
0.4126  (0.4923) 
 
0.3687  (0.4825) 
 
Age 42.5755  (9.8679) 
 
47.4451  (10.3126) 
 
39.3932  (8.3038) 
 
Household size 3.4638  (1.2110) 
 
3.8573  (1.2832) 
 
3.0541  (1.2571) 
 
Number of children 1.1734  (1.1418) 
 
0.9440  (1.0567) 
 
1.0322  (1.0395) 
 
log(Gross household income) 11.3989  (0.5827) 
 
6.5658  (0.4644) 
 
8.2963  (0.4940) 
 
Payment-to-Income ratio 0.2394  (0.3743)   0.2208  (0.3133)   0.1723  (0.0760)   
N 3,588    5,747    2,978    
Note: Gross household income is measured in each country’s currency unit. However, in the estimation, this doesn’t cause any problems since we take a log 
for both dependent and independent (income) variables, allowing us to interpret estimated coefficients as income elasticity (which are unit-free). 
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Table 2: Mortgage demand function 
      Regression results    Test for coefficient equality 
Dependent var.: Australia 
  
Japan 
  
UK 
   
All 
  
AUS vs 
JPN   
AUS vs 
UK  
  log(mortgage amount) Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
   
F value 
  
F value 
  
F value 
 
  (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)       (p-value)     (p-value)     (p-value)   
Fixed rate mortgage = 1 -0.0630  ** 
 
-0.0294  ** 
 
-0.0184  ** 
  
1.5331  
  
1.4287  
  
2.8726  * 
 
(0.0250) 
  
(0.0128) 
  
(0.0083) 
   
(0.2159) 
  
(0.2320) 
  
(0.0901) 
 
Age -0.0038  
  
-0.0108  ** 
 
0.0109  ** 
  
5.4948  *** 
 
0.9026  
  
4.1055  ** 
 
(0.0056) 
  
(0.0048) 
  
(0.0046) 
   
(0.0041) 
  
(0.3421) 
  
(0.0428) 
 
(Age/100)2 0.0029  
  
0.0131  *** 
 
-0.0216  *** 
  
10.5210  *** 
 
1.5640  
  
7.9908  *** 
 
(0.0065) 
  
(0.0050) 
  
(0.0058) 
   
(0.0000) 
  
(0.2111) 
  
(0.0047) 
 
Household size -0.0155  
  
-0.0062  
  
0.0044  
   
1.1209  
  
0.4419  
  
1.8692  
 
 
(0.0125) 
  
(0.0062) 
  
(0.0074) 
   
(0.3260) 
  
(0.5062) 
  
(0.1716) 
 
Number of children 0.0321  ** 
 
0.0313  *** 
 
0.0140  
   
1.2807  
  
0.0025  
  
1.3600  
 
 
(0.0129) 
  
(0.0080) 
  
(0.0086) 
   
(0.2779) 
  
(0.9598) 
  
(0.2436) 
 
log(gross household 
income) 
0.5274  *** 
 
0.3356  *** 
 
0.8888  *** 
  
340.6352  *** 
 
46.2451  *** 
 
227.6039  *** 
(0.0208) 
  
(0.0191) 
  
(0.0119) 
   
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0000) 
 
log(payment-to-income 
ratio) 
0.3576  *** 
 
0.2807  *** 
 
0.8208  *** 
  
409.9167  *** 
 
5.8268  ** 
 
215.3948  *** 
(0.0286)     (0.0141)     (0.0134)       (0.0000)     (0.0158)     (0.0000)   
Adjusted R2 0.6832  
  
0.2825  
  
0.8169  
           
N 3,588      5,747      2,978                        
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Table 3: Housing demand function 
     
     Regression results    Test for coefficient equality 
  
Dependent var.: Australia 
  
Japan 
  
UK 
   
All 
  
AUS vs 
JPN   
AUS vs 
UK  
  log(purchase price of 
home) 
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
   
F value 
  
F value 
  
F value 
 
  (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)       (p-value)     (p-value)     (p-value)   
Age 0.0224  *** 
 
-0.0201  *** 
 
0.0172  *** 
  
27.4778  *** 
 
39.5351  *** 
 
0.3718  
 
 
(0.0058) 
  
(0.0034) 
  
(0.0060) 
   
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0000) 
  
(0.5420) 
 
(Age/100)2 -0.0135  ** 
 
0.0267  *** 
 
-0.0075  
   
19.9880  *** 
 
28.8777  *** 
 
0.3972  
 
 
(0.0066) 
  
(0.0035) 
  
(0.0069) 
   
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0000) 
  
(0.5285) 
 
Household size -0.0087  
  
0.0139  *** 
 
-0.0168  
   
4.2578  ** 
 
2.9599  * 
 
0.2528  
 
 
(0.0121) 
  
(0.0051) 
  
(0.0106) 
   
(0.0142) 
  
(0.0854) 
  
(0.6151) 
 
Number of children 0.0447  *** 
 
0.0027  
  
0.0525  *** 
  
9.3407  *** 
 
8.7550  *** 
 
0.1978  
 
 
(0.0128) 
  
(0.0063) 
  
(0.0119) 
   
(0.0001) 
  
(0.0031) 
  
(0.6565) 
 
log(gross household 
income) 
0.4059  *** 
 
0.3742  *** 
 
0.4956  *** 
  
15.6439  *** 
 
1.7821  
  
13.5332  *** 
 
(0.0183) 
  
(0.0152) 
  
(0.0162) 
   
(0.0000) 
  
(0.1819) 
  
(0.0002) 
 
log(payment-to-income 
ratio) 
0.1744  *** 
 
0.1929  *** 
 
0.2055  *** 
  
0.7989  
  
0.8641  
  
1.4989  
 
  (0.0166)     (0.0110)     (0.0192)       (0.4499)     (0.3526)     (0.2209)   
Adjusted R2 0.6683  
  
0.3285  
  
0.6763  
           
N 3,579      5,747      5,458                        
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Table 4: Initial Loan to Value Ratio function 
 
     Regression results    Test for coefficient equality 
Dependent var.: Australia 
  
Japan 
  
UK 
   
All 
  
AUS vs 
JPN   
AUS vs 
UK  
  log(initial LTV) Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
   
F value 
  
F value 
  
F value 
 
  (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)       (p-value)     (p-value)     (p-value)   
Fixed rate mortgage = 1 -0.0108  
  
-0.0407  *** 
 
-0.0159  
   
1.4672  
  
1.3873  
  
0.0389  
 
 
(0.0229) 
  
(0.0109) 
  
(0.0119) 
   
(0.2306) 
  
(0.2389) 
  
(0.8436) 
 
Age -0.0258  *** 
 
0.0091  ** 
 
-0.0142  ** 
  
13.9448  *** 
 
25.6830  *** 
 
1.9663  
 
 
(0.0055) 
  
(0.0042) 
  
(0.0062) 
   
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0000) 
  
(0.1609) 
 
(Age/100)2 0.0160  ** 
 
-0.0133  *** 
 
-0.0007  
   
7.4366  *** 
 
14.7073  *** 
 
2.8097  * 
 
(0.0063) 
  
(0.0043) 
  
(0.0077) 
   
(0.0006) 
  
(0.0001) 
  
(0.0937) 
 
Household size -0.0083  
  
-0.0202  *** 
 
-0.0007  
   
1.4437  
  
0.6784  
  
0.1998  
 
 
(0.0133) 
  
(0.0055) 
  
(0.0108) 
   
(0.2361) 
  
(0.4102) 
  
(0.6549) 
 
Number of children -0.0113  
  
0.0287  *** 
 
-0.0202  * 
  
7.8673  *** 
 
6.6381  *** 
 
0.2364  
 
 
(0.0139) 
  
(0.0070) 
  
(0.0120) 
   
(0.0004) 
  
(0.0100) 
  
(0.6269) 
 
log(gross household 
income) 
0.1257  *** 
 
-0.0383  ** 
 
0.1046  *** 
  
29.2475  *** 
 
45.9413  *** 
 
0.6280  
 
(0.0189) 
  
(0.0151) 
  
(0.0188) 
   
(0.0000) 
  
(0.0000) 
  
(0.4281) 
 
log(payment-to-income 
ratio) 
 
0.1915  *** 
 
0.0878  *** 
 
0.3104  *** 
  
42.5435  *** 
 
19.0255  *** 
 
13.8019  *** 
(0.0217)     (0.0098)     (0.0235)       (0.0000)     (0.0000)     (0.0002)   
Adjusted R2 0.1369  
  
0.0921  
  
0.2431  
           
N 3,579      5,747      2,978                        
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Table 5: Estimates of function incorporating time period as independent variables 
Dependent var.: log(mortgage amount) 
 
  log(purchase price of home) 
 
log(initial LTV) 
 
Australia 
  
Japan 
  
UK 
  
Australia 
  
Japan 
  
UK 
  
Australia 
  
Japan 
  
UK 
 
 
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
  (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)   
Age -0.0060  
  
-0.0108  ** 
 
-0.0013  
  
0.0205  *** 
 
-0.0200  *** 
 
0.0175  *** 
 
-0.0262  *** 
 
0.0093  ** 
 
-0.0152  
 
 
(0.0058) 
  
(0.0049) 
  
(0.0076) 
  
(0.0056) 
  
(0.0034) 
  
(0.0061) 
  
(0.0055) 
  
(0.0042) 
  
(0.0094) 
 
(Age/100)2 0.0053  
  
0.0123  ** 
 
-0.0071  
  
-0.0114  * 
 
0.0262  *** 
 
-0.0088  
  
0.0164  *** 
 
-0.0139  *** 
 
-0.0023  
 
 
(0.0067) 
  
(0.0051) 
  
(0.0092) 
  
(0.0064) 
  
(0.0036) 
  
(0.0069) 
  
(0.0063) 
  
(0.0043) 
  
(0.0111) 
 
Household size -0.0074  
  
-0.0056  
  
0.0122  
  
-0.0011  
  
0.0141  *** 
 
-0.0110  
  
-0.0072  
  
-0.0197  *** 
 
0.0289  * 
 
(0.0125) 
  
(0.0061) 
  
(0.0139) 
  
(0.0121) 
  
(0.0051) 
  
(0.0105) 
  
(0.0134) 
  
(0.0055) 
  
(0.0166) 
 
Number of children 0.0269  ** 
 
0.0316  *** 
 
0.0097  
  
0.0395  *** 
 
0.0028  
  
0.0442  *** 
 
-0.0120  
  
0.0288  *** 
 
-0.0424  ** 
 
(0.0129) 
  
(0.0080) 
  
(0.0161) 
  
(0.0126) 
  
(0.0063) 
  
(0.0118) 
  
(0.0139) 
  
(0.0070) 
  
(0.0184) 
 
log(gross household income) 
  Purchase year prior to 
1990 
0.3041  *** 
 
0.2419  *** 
 
0.5506  *** 
 
0.2045  *** 
 
0.2919  *** 
 
0.3763  *** 
 
0.1007  *** 
 
-0.0500  * 
 
0.1752  *** 
(0.0410) 
  
(0.0390) 
  
(0.0557) 
  
(0.0334) 
  
(0.0310) 
  
(0.0339) 
  
(0.0326) 
  
(0.0260) 
  
(0.0603) 
 
  Between 1991 and 1995 
0.4528 *** 
 
0.2429 *** 
 
0.6806 *** 
 
0.3356 *** 
 
0.3589 *** 
 
0.3973 *** 
 
0.1213 *** 
 
-0.1159 *** 
 
0.274 *** 
(0.0397) 
  
(0.0369) 
  
(0.0488) 
  
(0.0379) 
  
(0.0268) 
  
(0.0320) 
  
(0.0341) 
  
(0.0349) 
  
(0.0512) 
 
  Between 1996 and 2000 
0.5354 *** 
 
0.3587 *** 
 
0.712 *** 
 
0.3995 *** 
 
0.3754 *** 
 
0.4515 *** 
 
0.1392 *** 
 
-0.0167 
  
0.2619 *** 
(0.0285) 
  
(0.0261) 
  
(0.0460) 
  
(0.0252) 
  
(0.0222) 
  
(0.0422) 
  
(0.0276) 
  
(0.0231) 
  
(0.0596) 
 
  Between 2001 and 2005 
0.6029 *** 
 
0.4329 *** 
 
0.8008 *** 
 
0.5446 *** 
 
0.438 *** 
 
0.6475 *** 
 
0.0621 * 
 
-0.0051 
  
0.1512 *** 
(0.0330) 
  
(0.0330) 
  
(0.0201) 
  
(0.0323) 
  
(0.0265) 
  
(0.0215) 
  
(0.0321) 
  
(0.0273) 
  
(0.0243) 
 
  After 2006 0.6194 *** 
 
0.5107 *** 
 
0.792 *** 
 
0.3774 *** 
 
0.4819 *** 
 
0.596 *** 
 
0.246 *** 
 
0.0287 
  
0.1946 *** 
 
(0.0359) 
  
(0.0609) 
  
(0.0187) 
  
(0.0498) 
  
(0.0647) 
  
(0.0194) 
  
(0.0467) 
  
(0.0576) 
  
(0.0239) 
 
log(payment-to-income 
ratio) 
0.3560  *** 
 
0.2765  *** 
 
0.6382  *** 
 
0.1738  *** 
 
0.1908  *** 
 
0.1962  *** 
 
0.1913  *** 
 
0.0857  *** 
 
0.4479  *** 
(0.0285)     (0.0141)     (0.0252)     (0.0163)     (0.0111)     (0.0188)     (0.0216)     (0.0099)     (0.0307)   
Adjusted R2 0.6879  
  
0.2865  
  
0.5515  
  
0.6741  
  
0.3309  
  
0.6813  
  
0.1413  
  
0.0916  
  
0.1816  
 
N 3,588      5,747      5,227      3,579      5,747      5,458      3,579      5,747      5,227    
                           
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects 
for urban/rural area, regions, and year of mortgage origination are controlled in all estimation but omitted from the results. 
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